

Message Text

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FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3316

INFO ALL CSCE CAPITALS 296

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 GENEVA 3993

NOFORN

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y FOR TAGS AND SUBJECT

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE PFOR XG

SUBJECT: CSCE: SOME THOUGHTS ON WHERE WE ARE GOING

USNATO ALSO FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

1. SUMMARY: THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE NOW ENTERED THEIR LONG-EXPECTED CRUNCH. BEFORE BECOMING WHOLLY ABSORBED IN THIS FINAL NEGOTIATING EFFORT WE HAVE TRIED TO DRAW ON OUR EXPERIENCE, AND TO SET DOWN SOME SHORT AND LONGER-TERM REFLECTIONS REGARDING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CSCE PROCESS FOR EUROPE, AND OF THE KIND OF EUROPE WE AND OUR ALLIES MAY BE CONFRONTED WITH IN THE COMING YEARS. FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF OUR INTENSIVE INVOLVEMENT IN THE CONFERENCE WE STILL BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A GOOD CASE TO BE MADE IN FAVOR OF SOME CONTINUING CSCE PROCESS, PROVIDED WESTERN UNITY CAN BE MAINTAINED. HOWEVER, WE ALSO SEE POTENTIAL DANGERS AHEAD AND WOULD STRESS THAT IT WILL BE A CONSIDERABLE TIME UNTIL ALL THE CARDS ARE IN AND A DEFINITIVE JUDGEMENT ON CSCE CAN BE MADE. WE END THIS TELEGRAM WITH SOME TENTATIVE SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE US POLICY.

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END SUMMARY.

2. BARRING LAST MINUTE DERAILMENT THERE IS LITTLE QUESTION THAT CSCE HAS BECOME A MAJOR ELEMENT OF THE DETENTE PROCESS IN EUROPE. LOOKED AT IN QUANTITATIVE TERMS, IT HAS BROUGHT TOGETHER EAST AND WEST, ALLIES AND NEUTRALS IN THE LARGEST EXCHANGE OF IDEAS IN POST-WORLD WAR II HISTORY. THE EXPECTED SUMMIT IN HELSINKI WILL BE THE MOST FAR-REACHING OF ALL-EUROPEAN GATHERINGS OF GOVERNMENT LEADERS SINCE VERSAILLES. THE SCOPE OF THE AGENDA IS THE MOST EXTENSIVE OF ANY SUCH MEETING SINCE WORLD WAR II. MOREOVER, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 35 NATIONS INVOLVED HAVE MADE VARYING DEGREES OF EFFORT OVER A TWO YEAR PERIOD TO LEARN TO UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER'S VIEWS, TO COMMUNICATE ACROSS TRADITIONAL BARRIERS, AND TO PERSIST UNTIL AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN HAMMERED OUT.

3. ALL THIS HAS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE, PRACTICAL AND SYMBOLIC IMPLICATIONS. FOR THE FIRST TIME THE NON-COMMUNIST EUROPEAN AND THE ATLANTIC STATES HAVE JOINTLY INDICATED, THROUGH THEIR ATTENDANCE AT THIS CONFERENCE, THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO TREAT COLLECTIVELY WITH THE USSR AND ITS ALLIES. FOR THE COMMUNIST PARTICIPANTS THIS MEANS, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, AN INDIRECT BUT SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARDS LEGITIMIZATION OF THEIR POST-WORLD WAR II TERRITORIAL GAINS AND A FURTHER ASSURANCE OF THE PERNAMENT DIVISION OF GERMANY. IT MEANS PUBLIC CONFIRMATION THAT WESTERN ABHORRENCE OF PAST (AND PRESENT) SOVIET BLOC INTERNAL EXCESSES IS RECEDING; THAT THE COMMUNIST COUNTERIES ARE BECOMING ACCEPTED, NOT JUST AS ECONOMIC PARTNERS BUT AS CONDITIONAL MEMBERS IN A BROADER EUROPEAN COMMUNITY BASED ON COMITY; AND, FOR THE PRESUMED MAJORITY IN MOSCOW SUPPORTING THE BREZHNEV FOREIGN POLICY APPROACH, IT IS A FURTHER KEY PROOF OF HIS SUCCESS AND MERIT.

4. FOR THE WEST, THE CSCE PROCESS MAY ALSO BRING NEW COLLECTIVE ADVANTAGES, IN SETTING THE STAGE FOR EXPANDED HUMAN CONTACTS, AND AN EASING OF THE ATMOSPHERE, BOTH IN THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY FIELDS, HOWEVER, THE BURDEN OF IMPLEMENTING CSCE DECISIONS WILL FALL PRIMARILY ON THE COMMUNIST

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SIDE. FOR IN RETURN FOR ADVANTAGES GAINED, THE WARSAW PACT IS IN THE PROCESS OF ACCEPTING A CERTAIN MORTGAGING OF ITS FUTURE BEHAVIOR -- ALTHOUGH EXACTLY HOW SIGNIFICANT THAT MORTGAGE WILL BE IS THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF OUR CURRENT, INCREASINGLY TOUGH, FINAL NEGOTIATIONS. JUDGING FROM PAST SOVIET BEHAVIOR, FOR INSTANCE ON BERLIN, THIS CONTROVERSY OF HOW THE SOVIETS WILL INTERPRET THE CSCE OBLIGATIONS WILL CONTINUE IN THE POST-

CSCE YEARS, PARTICULARLY IF THE WEST TRIES TO HOLD THEIR FEET TO THE FIRE, AND THE FIRE IS LARGE ENOUGH TO HAVE REAL MEANING.

5. FOR THE NEUTRALS, THAT IS FOR THOSE OUTSIDE THE NINE, THE FIFTEEN AND THE WARSAW PACT, AS WELL AS THE DISSIDENT COMMUNIST STATES LIKE ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA -- CSCE HAS ALSO BEEN BOTH A PROMISING AND FRUSTRATING EXPERIENCE. ALTHOUGH THEY ARE IN SOME WAYS OBTAINING A GOOD DEAL LESS THAN THEY HAD HOPED, THEY ARE AT LEAST BEING ALLOWED TO PARTICIPATE IN THEMJOR LEAGUES. FOR SOME, LIKE ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA, THE CSCE PROCESS LOOKS LIKE A NEW LIFELINE, TO WHICH THEY CAN TRY TO CLING IF SOVIET PRESSURES ARE RENEWED. TO OTHERS, LIKE THE MEDITERRANEAN STATES, IT IS A HOPEFULLY CONTINUING MEANS OF PURSUING NATIONAL AND REGIONAL INTERESTS, ALBEIT WITH POTENTIALLY DEVISIVE OVERTONES, I.E. MALTA'S DRIVE FOR A MEDITERRANIAN "IDENTITY" AND SPECIAL MEDITERRANEAN-ARAB LINKS. FOR STILL OTHERS, LIKE SOME OF THE SCAND-INAVIDIAN STATES, CSCE PROVIDES NEW INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS TO PRESS POLITICAL IDEAS AND HUMANITARIAN AND IDEOLOGICAL DEMANDS, PARTLY FOR THEIR OWN DOMESTIC REASONS. TAKEN TOGETHER, THE NON-ALIGNED AND NEUTRALS HAVE FOUND IN CSCE THE FIRST COMPREHENSIVE EUROPEAN FRAMEWORK IN WHICH EHY CAN PRESENT AND WORK FOR THEIR SPECIFIC INTERESTS.

6. IN SUM, THE CSCE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE WORKED SO FAR BECAUSE, UP TO THIS POINT AT LEAST, THE ADVANTAGES OF GOING ALONG HAVE SEEMED TO OUTWEIGH THE DISADVANTAGES, ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY IN EACH SUBJECT AREA. THE QUESTION OF THE

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 GENEVA 3993

NOFORN

USNATO ALSO FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

IMMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM FUTURE IS WHETHER THIS IS LIKELY
TO CONTINUE TO BE THE CASE; AND, IF SO, UNDER WHAT
CONDITIONS AND TO WHAT EXTENT.

7. IT IS ON THIS SCORE THAT WE ARE A GOOD DEAL LESS
CONFIDENT. A MULTILATERALLY ADVANTAGEOUS CONTINUATION
OF THE CSCE PROCESS, AND MAINTENANCE OF THE MOMENTUM
OF MULTILATERAL POLITICAL DETENTE IN EUROPE, WILL DEPEND IN THE
FIRST INSTANCE ON THE KIND OF DEAL WHICH IS STRUCK NOW IN
THE FINAL STAGE II NEGOTIATIONS. BEYOND THAT, IN THE
"FOLLOW-UP", CSCE'S DESIRABILITY
WILL IN LARGE PART BE A FUNCTION OF THE WEST'S ABILITY
TO MAINTAIN ITS UNITY, TO RENEW ITS COHESION AND TO RE-
sist THE TEMPTATIONS OF SOVIET TACTICS OF PEDDLING
DETENTE FOR DETENTE'S SAKE, WHILE PROBING FOR WEAKNESSES
AND DIVISIONS. NONE OF THESE IN OUR VIEW ARE FORE-
GONE CONCLUSIONS.

8. CSCE'S IMMEDIATE HURDLE WILL, OF COURSE, BE THE DEAL
WE WORK OUT HERE IN THE COMING WEEKS. AS FAR AS THE
SOVIETS ARE CONCERNED, THERE ARE NO SIGNS SO
FAR THAT THEIR BASIC NEGOTIATING AIMS HAVE CHANGED. AFTER
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TWO YEARS IN GENEVA IT IS CLEAR TO US THAT PEACEFUL CO-
EXISTENCE, DETENTE AND EAST-WEST COOPERATION MEAN LITTLE
MORE TO THEM THAN A NEW MEANS TO OBTAIN MAXIMUM AD-
VANTAGES WHILE CONTINUING TO EXPAND THEIR INFLUENCE
THROUGH OTHER MEANS. IN CSCE THEY FIRST SOUGHT TO
CONSOLIDATE WHAT DE FACTO THEY ALREADY HAD, THEN TO
GAIN NEW AREAS OF INFLUENCE, WHILE TRYING TO EXCLUDE
THOSE INITIATIVES, PARTICULARLY IN BASKET III, WHICH
COULD CREATE INTERNATL DIFFICULTIES FOR THEMSELVES.
NOW, TO BRING THE CONFERENCE TO A RAPID CONCLUSION,
THEY ARE USING EVERY POSSIBLE TECHNIQUE -- SUCH AS
APPEALS FROM POLITICAL GROUPS IN THE WEST, IMPLIED
THREATS OF THE "CONSEQUENCES" OF FAILURE, AND IN-
CREASINGLY HEAVY-HANDED PRESSURING OF OUR OWN AND OTHER
DELEGATIONS. THE OBJECT IS OBVIOUSLY TO SEE WHETHER
THE WEST'S MINIMAL POSITIONS CAN BE CRACKED -- AN
OUTCOME WHICH WOULD RESULT NOT ONLY IN ADDITIONAL
SUBSTANTIVE GAINS FOR THE USSR, BUT IN INEVITABLE LOSS

OF UNITY AND SELF-CONFIDENCE AMONG THE WESTERN ALLIES.
FOR THE EUROPEANS, AND FOR THE CSCE PROCESS IN THE LONGER
TERM, SUCH AN UNEVEN OUTCOME WOULD, OF COURSE, NO LONGER
REFLECT A SITUATION OF GENUINE DETENTE I.E. OF A MUTUALITY
OF CONCESSIONS, BUT WOULD PROBABLY BE SEEN, RET-
ROSPECTIVELY, AS THE FIRST STEP TOWARD WEST EUROPEAN
PSYCHOLOGICAL ADJUSTMENT TO THE IDEA OF SOVIET PRE-
DOMINANCE ON THE EUROPEAN CONTINENT.

9. SO FAR THE NINE AND THE FIFTEEN HAVE, BY AND LARGE
(AND WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS), HELD THEIR GROUND ON THE KEY
ISSUES. THEY HAVE DONE SO IN LARGE PART OUT OF GENUINE
CONVICTION. HOWEVER, IT IS CLEAR TO US THAT
THEY ARE ALSO GREATLY ENCOURAGED AND HELPED IN
DOING SO BY THE FACT THAT WE OURSELVES ARE AT THIS STAGE
BEING JUST AS FIRM (I.E. THE SECRETARY'S STATEMENT ON
CSCE IN HIS MAY 24 PRESS CONFERENCE) AND ARE FULLY
SHARING WITH THEM THE BRUNT OF THESE CONFRONTATIONS,

10. THERE ARE, OF COURSE, OBVIOUS RISKS IN DECLINING TO
CONTINUE INDEFINITELY TO SPLIT ALL THE DIFFERENCES
WITH THE FUSSIANS. IT IS ARGUED THAT THE CONTINUING
INABILITY OF THE USSR TO MAKE HE FEW CONCESSIONS

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NECESSARY TO GET THEIR MUCH-DESIRED JULY CSCE SUMMIT
SUGGESTS THE EXISTENCE OF CLEAVAGES IN MOSCOW, NOT AS
TO SOVIET GOALS, BUT AS TO CURRENT TACTICS. IF BREZHNEV
SUCCEEDS PARTICULARLY IF HE SUCCEEDS QUICKLY IN GETTING
HIS YEARNED-FOR CSCE SUMMIT, THIS ANALYSIS SUGGESTS THAT
HIS BRAND OF SOFT-SELL DETENTE WILL PROBABLY BE PERPETUATED.
IF HE FAILS, OR A DELAYED CSCE SUMMIT IS TOO GRUDGINGLY
ARRIVED AT, DETENTE SOVIET VERSION COULD, ACCORDING
TO THIS SYLLOGISM, BE IN QUESTION, AND A NEW PERHAPS
COLDER BREEZE COULD BE EXPECTED FROM TH EAST.

11. EVEN IF ALL THIS WERE TURE, WE ARE
CONVINCED THAT FOR THE WEST THE LONG-TERM RISKS ARE
NOW MUCH GREATER ON THE OTHER SIDE, I.E. IF WE WERE
TO GET WHITLED DOWN AND SPLIT APART AT THIS STAGE, TO
THE POINT WHERE A SUMMIT BECOMES DIFFICULT TO DEFEND
TO THE WESTERN PUBLIC, AND WHERE, FROM THE AVERAGE MAN'S
POINT OF VIEW, CSCE IMPLEMENATION IN THE FOLLOW-UP
WERE TO BE LARGELY A MATTER OF RECOGNIZING SOVIET
GAINS. THE WEST HAS ALREADY MADE EXTENSIVE CSCE
CONCESSIONS TO MOSCOW IN THE LAST TWO YEARS. TO PAY
MUCH MORE NOW, IN THE PERHAPS FORLORN HOPE OF INFLUENCING
SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS SO AS TO INSURE SOVIET GOOD
WILL SEEKS TO US EXCESSIVE AND UNWISE. WE THEREFORE
BELIEVE THAT CONTINUED FIRMNESS IN THE COMING WEEKS,

AND EVEN OCCASIONAL US LEADERSHIP, MAY BE AN INDISPENSABLE
PRECONDITION TO ASSURING, NOT JUST AN EVEN-HANDED OUT-
COME, BUT THE MEANINGFUL CONTINUATION OF THIS KEY EAST-
WEST PROCESS AND OF DETENTE.

12. FOR THE LONGER TERM, WHATEVER SIGNIFICANCE CSCE
MAY HAVE WILL DEPEND AS MUCH ON THE EVOLUTION OF WESTERN
EUROPE AND ITS ATLANTIC CONTEXT AS ON ANY OTHER FACTOR.
FROM OUR, PERHAPS LIMITED, PERSPECTIVE, EUROPE NOW SEEMS
NOT MERELY FIGUATIVELY, BUT LITERALLY TO BE APPROACH-
ING A MAJOR TURNING POINT. THE CLEAR LINES BETWEEN EAST
AND WEST OF AN EARLIER TIME ARE GONE OR FAST ERODING.
THE FEAR OF DIRECT SOVIET ACTION IN WESTERN EUROPE IS, RIGHTLY
OR WRONGLY, LESS PALPABLE. SOVIET POLITICAL AMBITIONS
ARE SUBTLER, AND THEREFORE MORE FREQUENTLY MISUNDERSTOOD.
THE RESULTS ARE EROSION OF POLITICAL WILL, DECLINE

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DEFENSE BUDGETS AND GROWING CREDULITY AS TO SOVIET
MOTIVES. THERE ARE ALSO NEW POLICAL FACTORS, I.E.
THE DANGEROUS DECLINE IN INTERNAL STABILITY IN THE

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NOFORN

USNATO ALSO FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

SOUTHERN TIER; A NEW ASSERTIVENESS BY THE SMALLER,
PARTICULARLY THE MORE NEUTRAL STATES; AND THE INTAGIBLE
CONSEQUENCES OF THE DROP IN AMERICAN PRESTIGE. THE
NEW PRESSURES CREATED BY THE FUEL AND RAW MATERIAL
CRISES FURTHER DISTORT THE PRESENT EUROPEAN IMAGE.
FINALLY THERE IS THE UNCERTAINTY
OVER THE EVOLUTION OF NEW EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR
RELATIONSHIP TO THE US.

13. GIVEN THESE GREAT IMPOUNDERABLES IT IS NOT SUR-
PRISING THAT THERE ARE STRONG EUROPEAN TEMPTATIONS TO
TAKE THE PATH OF LEAST RESISTENCE AND TO MAKE IN-
CREASINGLY SUBSTANTIVE ACCOMODATIONS WITH THE SOVIET
UNION. WE FEEL THIS PULL STRONGLY IN THE MICROCOISM
OF THS CONFERENCE. THERE IS THE TEMPTATION, PARTICULARLY
IN EUROPEAN CAPITALS, TO USE CSCE AS WELL AS OTHER ISSUES
TO CURRY BILATERAL FAVOR AT THE EXPENSE OF ALLIES; TO
REFLECT THE COMMUNIST AFFINITIES OF SOME ELECTORATES;
OR SIMPLY TO ASSUME, AS SOME DO, THAT WESTERN EUROPE IS
DESTINED TO SLIDE FOR FEAR THAT THE US NO LONGER HAS
THE WILL TO ACT WITH RESOLUTION. WHETHER OR NOT THE
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CSCE FOLLOW-UP MECHANISM, A STRUCTURE WHICH WILL CUT
ACROSS THE TRADITIONAL EAST-WEST DIVIDING LINES, WILL
SERVE PRIMARILY AS A VEHICLE FOR THESE NEGATIVE TENDENCIES,
OR WILL INSTEAD SERVE BELANCED AND CONSTRUCTUIVE ENDS,
INCLUDING THAT OF HOLDING THE SOVIETS TO THEIR CSCE
PROMISES, WILL DEPEND ON THE CONTINUING STATE OF CON-
FIDENCE IN EUROPE ITSELF.

14. ON THIS SCORE, ONE SHOULD BY NO MEANS UNDER-
ESTIMATE THE SUBSTANTIAL CORE OF WESTERN EUROPEAN
FIRMNESS AND RESOLVE WHICH REMAINS INTACT, IN FACT,
IT SEEMS TO US THAT THERE HAS ALSO BEEN A
CERTAIN SIMULTANEOUS RENAISSANCE IN EUROPEAN ELAN, I.E.
A MORE CONSCIOUS, IF STILL WEAK EFFORT TO LAY THE BASIS
FOR AF FUTURE WEST EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNITY, WITH RE-
NEWED LINKS TO THE UNITED STATES. EVEN THE CSCE PRO-
ESSS ITSELF HAS SERVED TO BOLSTER THIS SIDE OF EUROPE'S
SCHEZOPHRENIC OUTLOOK:

FIRST, SOVIET NEGOTIATING TACTICS HAVE DRIVEN
HOME SOME NEW LESSONS ABOUT MOSCOW'S VERSION OF
"REAL-POLITIK".
SECONDLY, CSCE HAS BEEN THE FIRST REAL TEXT OF
"EUROPE'S" COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATING ABILITY, WHILE

THEIR RECORD HAS BEEN FAR FROM PERFECT, THE EC-NINE IN PARTICULAR HAVE GROWN IN STATURE AS A POLITICAL GROUPING, BECAUSE THEY HAVE MANAGED, BY AND LARGE, TO MEET THE TEST OF SHAPING AND STICKING TO COMMONLY ARRIVED-AT POLITICAL POSITIONS IN CSCE.

THIRDLY, WHILE CSCE'S FOCUS IS ON DETENTE, IT HAS INEVITABLY ALSO SERVED TO STIMULATE NEW WESTERN EUROPEAN THINKING (PARTICULARLY IN FRANCE, GERMANY, THE BENELUX) ABOUT THE CONVERSE I.E. ON THE LIMITS OF DENTENTE DICTATED BY EUROPE'S OWN VITAL INTERESTS IN ITS FUTURE ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS AND CONTINUING LINKS TO THE US.

15. IN SUM, THE CONTEXT IN WHICH CSCE WILL OPERATE AS A NEW PAN-EUROPEAN FACTOR IS FULL OF UNCERTAINTIES, ON THE RESOLUTION OF WHICH ITS ROLE AND ITS FUTURE UTILITY

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FROM OUR VIEW POPOINT WILL HEAVILY DEPEND. THIS RAISES KEY QUESTIONS AS TO THE ROLE THE US SHOULD PLAY IN THE COMING YEARS. THE LOW PROFILE WE HAVE ADOPTED IN EUROPE IN THE RECENT PAST, PARTICULARLY HERE AT CSCE, HAS SERVED US WELL IN DIMINISHING UNNECESSARY ATMOSPHERIC TENSIONS AND SUSPICIONS OF SUPER-POWER HEGEMONY. OUR SUPPORT FOR DENTENTE HAS AND WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO PAY SOME EUROPEAN DIVIDENDS. THE RETREAT FROM VIETNAM DEFUSES ANOTHER MAJOR FRICTION AREA. INDEED, IF MATTERS COULD BE WORKED OUT IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE STAGE MIGHT WELL BE SET FOR A MORE EFFECTIVE US-EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIP.

16. EUROPE, WE BELIEVE, CAN CONTINUE TO MAKE DO WITHOUT THE DAY-BY-DAY TYPE OF US LEADERSHIP OF AN EARLIER TIME. HOWEVER, BASIC US AND EUROPEAN INTERESTS ARE SO INTERWOVEN, AND THE CONTESTING FORCES ARE SO EVENLY DIVIDED, THAT WESTERN EUROPE MAY WELL NOT SUCCEED IN REORDERING ITS COLLECTIVE AFFAIRS FOR THE LONG HAUL WITHOUT A CLEAR US POLICY LEAD ON THE CENTRAL QUESTIONS, PARTICULARLY AS TO OUR LONG-TERM VIEW OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL AND MILITARY INTEGRATION, AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO ATLANTIC TIES.

17. THIS, IN OUR VIEW, IS THE MAJOR UNDERLYING PROBLEM WHICH THE EUROPEANS WILL NOT RESOLVE BY THEMSELVES WITHOUT POLICY HELP FROM US. IF A STRONGER SELF-CONFIDENT WESTERN EUROPE CAN BE GIVEN NEW LIFE, WE BELIEVE THE NEGATIVE POTENTIAL OF THE LONGER-RANGE ROLE OF THE CSCE CAN BE CONTAINED, AND THE

ADVANTAGES, PRIMARILY OF BASKET III, MADE GOOD. CONVERSELY
IN A DETERIOTATING SITUATION, IT COULD BE-
COME A VEHICLE CONTRIBUTING TO UNCERTAINTY AND SOVIET
INTERFERENCE.

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